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SUFFICIENCY OF A SEPARATION AGREEMENT FOR TAX
PURPOSES-Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340 (1982)
In Jacklin v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court addressed a dispute con-
cerning the deductibility of alimony payments under a separation agree-
ment that did not specify a dollar amount. Under this agreement, the
payor spouse was to pay to the recipient spouse whatever funds were nec-
essary to sustain the standard of living which she had previously enjoyed.
The court held that this agreement was sufficiently precise under section
71(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to allow the payor spouse to deduct
the payments. 2
This Note explores the legal tensions created by the court's decision. It
asserts that the decision blurs the line between voluntary and obligatory
payments and creates practical problems for all concerned. The Note then
addresses the court's primary reason for its decision: its fear that the re-
quirement of a specific dollar amount of alimony would be a trap for the
unwary. 3 Finally, it proposes that the problems created by the Jacklin
decision can be resolved by requiring the separation agreement to state a
dollar figure for support.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
To give effect to our system of progressive tax rates, the income tax
laws generally prohibit the transfer of income from a higher-bracket tax-
payer to a lower-bracket taxpayer.4 An exception to this prohibition was
1. 79 T.C. 340 (1982).
2. Before the payor spouse can qualify for a § 215 deduction, the recipient spouse must come
within § 71 and thus be required to include the payment in gross income. 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215
(1976) [26 U.S.C. hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
3. 79T.C.at351.
4. Phillips, "Separated" Under State Law May Not Be "Separated" for Purposes of the Section
215 Deduction And Section 71 Inclusion, TAxEs, Oct. 1982, at 720, 721. See Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (case decided prior to the advent of the joint return); J. FREELAND, S. Lnm
& R. STrm1ENs, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 269, 270 (4th ed. 1982).
Even an attempt to make such a transfer before the transferor has actually received a payment will
not be successful. If a transferor retains any control over the transfer of a payment he or she will be
held to have income. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). Only in an extreme case where the
transferor refuses to receive a payment altogether and makes no stipulations regarding the disposition
of the money will the court hold that the transferor has not received income. Commissioner v. Gian-
nini, 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2 C.B. 25 (amounts received for
services performed by a faculty member under a clinical program which are turned over to the univer-
sity are not income to the faculty member). See generally Note, Disclaimers in Federal Taxation, 63
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incorporated into the Code in 1942 to allow income-splitting between di-
vorced or separated spouses when specific requirements are met.5
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942,6 payments made pursuant to a sepa-
ration or divorce were neither taxable to the recipient 7 nor deductible by
the payor. 8 The payor spouse thus was taxed on income he or she could
not use. 9 As wartime tax rates soared, this burden on the payor spouse
often became unbearable. 10
In 1942, Congress remedied this economic burden by creating an inclu-
sion/deduction method for treatment of alimony. 11 The statutory prede-
cessors of section 71(a)(1) and section 215 provided for the inclusion of
alimony in the income of the recipient spouse and granted a correspond-
ing deduction to the payor spouse. 12 To qualify under the 1942 provi-
HARV. L. REV 1047 (1950) (discussing the tax consequences that follow from the property doctrine
that a transfer is not complete until accepted by the intended recipient).
5. Revenue Act of 1942, Ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 22k, 23u (1942), su-
persededby I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1976)).
6. Id.
7. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) (holding that alimony paid to a recipient spouse should
be excluded from gross income).
8. Prior to 1942 the Code contained no statutory provisions allowing deductions for alimony
payments made by the payor spouse. I A. KRAGEN & J. McNuLTY. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 872
(3d ed. 1979). Without specific authorization by the Code, no deduction is allowed because a tax-
payer has no constitutional fight to a deduction. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 4,
at 351.
9. The payor spouse could possibly avoid paying income tax by utilizing an "alimony trust" if
under that state's laws the obligation to support could be discharged in a lump sum payment. Helver-
ing v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940). This option was unavailable, however, if local laws prohibited
such a discharge, the payor spouse lacked capital, or the recipient spouse refused to agree to such a
payment. 3 B. BITtKER. FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME. ESTATES AND GtFrs 77-3 (1981).
10. Id.; A. GUNN. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 184 (1981).
11. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 72 (1954).
The constitutionality of the 1942 provisions was challenged in Mahana v. United States, 88 F.
Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied. 339 U.S. 978 (1950). The challenge was based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Gould v. Gould that alimony was not income to the recipient spouse. The Mahana
court rejected this challenge because the Supreme Court in Gould was deciding a question of statutory
interpretation and not of constitutionality. The constitutionality of the 1942 provisions has never been
addressed by the Supreme Court, but commentators consider it settled. See 3 B. BrrrKER. supra note
9, at 77-4.
12. I.R.C. § 22k (1942) (superseded by I.R.C. § 71 (1976)) provided that periodic payments
should be included in the recipient spouse's gross income if they were received by the recipient
spouse after a decree of divorce or legal separation, and if the payor spouse made them to discharge a
legal duty imposed under the decree. I.R.C. § 23u (1942) (superseded by I.R.C. § 215 (1976)) al-
lowed a deduction to the payor spouse for payments that were included in the recipient's income
under I.R.C. § 22k. The effect of these provisions is continued in I.R.C. §§ 71,215 (1976).
As a result, the payor spouse is not taxed on income that he or she has earned, because the tax
originally paid on such income is returned as a deduction. Occasionally, however, the inclusion/
deduction scheme can create tax liability by taxing the recipient spouse on payments made by the
payor spouse even though the payor spouse has no taxable income to be offset by the deduction. See
Neeman v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 864 (1956), aff d, 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
841 (1958).
Separation Agreements and Income Tax
sions, the parties were required to be divorced or legally separated. 13
These requirements were intended to prevent a married couple from
avoiding tax liability by entering into an informal separation and filing
separate returns. 14
The advent of the income-splitting joint return in 194815 enabled Con-
gress to expand its treatment of alimony under the inclusion/deduction
provisions. By enacting section 71(a)(2) in the Revenue Act of 1954,16
Congress made the deduction/inclusion scheme available to a husband
and wife who had separated without a court decree. 17
B. Scope of the Inclusion/Deduction System
The inclusion/deduction mechanism permits separated parties to allo-
cate taxes between themselves through payments for support.18 Under
13. I.R.C. § 22k (1942) (superseded by I.R.C. § 71 (1976)) (requiring a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance).
14. Prior to the advent of the joint return, a married party's income was attributed solely to that
party and was not split between the two spouses. Thus a married couple with one primary wage-
earner would pay more tax, due to progressive tax rates, than a divorced couple who, after 1942, was
allowed to split its income through use of the inclusion/deduction system. 3 B. BrrrKER, supra note
9, at 77-5.
15. "Income splitting" between spouses was incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code by the
Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (codified at I.R.C. § l(a) (1976)), to equalize
treatment of spouses in the community. This Act provided that a husband and wife could, at their
option, split their combined income in half for purposes of calculating their income tax. This provi-
sion equalized tax treatment of married couples with the same total income regardless of the division
of that income; however, it also gave a substantial tax advantage to married couples filing jointly over
single taxpayers. At some income levels a single person's tax was 42. 1% higher than the tax paid by a
married couple filing jointly. In an attempt to remedy this situation Congress passed a lower tax
schedule for single taxpayers in 1969. 1 A. KRAGEN & J. McNtLTY, supra note 8, at 820-23; S.
SuREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANiE. & H. AuLT, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 1272-76 (1972). See
also 3 B. BrrrxR, supra note 9, at 111.33-.36 (discussing married couples-joint vs. separate re-
turns).
16. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591 ch. 736, 68A Stat. 19 (1954) (codified at
I.R.C. § 71(a)(2) (1976)). The section reads as follows:
Alimony and separate maintenance payments.
(a) General rule.
(2) Written separation agreement.
If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a written separation agreement executed
after the date of the enactment of [the 1954 Code], the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such agreement is executed
which are made under such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or
which are attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and
because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make a
single return jointly.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1954); S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1954).
18. I.R.C. § 62(B) provides that the alimony deduction authorized by § 215 is a deduction from
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this system, the parties choose initially how much income to transfer. 19
Once this choice is made and incorporated into a separation agreement,
the parties are bound. 20
To qualify under section 7 1(a)(2) several requirements must be met:21
(1) The parties must be separated, 22 (2) the parties must have executed a
written separation agreement after August 16, 1954,23 (3) the payments
gross income. This provision ensures that the payor spouse, whether or not he or she itemizes, is
merely a conduit through which income passes to the recipient spouse. 3 B. BITTKER. supra note 9, at
77-22 to -23. See also supra note 11 (explaining how the inclusion/deduction scheme can actually
create additional tax liability).
19. The general rule, in determining whether a payment is alimony, is that the court is not bound
by the labels the spouses attach to the payment. Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981); Schot-
tenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451 (1980); Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357 (1980);
Wamack v. Commissioner. 71 T.C. 541 (1979); Mirsky v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 664 (1971).
Under the guidance of a competent tax lawyer, however, the parties can usually structure their pay-
ments so as to choose on whom the tax burden will fall.
20. Modification of an agreement is controlled by state law. A separation agreement that is not
incorporated into a court decree can be modified by agreement of the parties like any other contract.
Note, Specific Performance of Separation Agreements-A New Remedy: Moore v. Moore, 12 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 207, 211 (1980). If after entering into the separation agreement, either party petitions the
court for dissolution of marriage, a decree of legal separation, or a declaration of invalidity of the
marriage, the terms of the existing separation agreement, except for provisions of custody, support,
and visitation of children, will be binding on the court unless the court finds that the separation
agreement was unfair. UNIF MARITAL DISSOL'N Acr § 306(b) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.09.070(3) (Supp. 1982). Once the terms of the separation agreement are incorporated into a court
decree, modification is subject to the more stringent control of the UNIF. MARITAL DISSOL'N AcT §
316(a), which provides that the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be
modified only on a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. See also WASH. REV. CODE §
26.09.170 (Supp. 1982) (modification of decree for maintenance or support). The Washington courts
have interpreted a substantial change of circumstances to mean circumstances that were not within the
contemplation of the parties when the decree was entered. McKendry v.McKendry, 2 Wn. App. 882,
472 P.2d 569 (1970). See also Note, Modification of Spousal Support: A Survey of a Confusing Area
of the Law. 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 735 (an analysis of the law surrounding modification of spousal
support); Note, Modification Due to Changed Circumstances, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 66 (1980) (analysis
of the law on modification of future alimony payments due to changed circumstances).
21. Mavity v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1965).
22. The IRS has taken the position that a husband and wife are not separated for purposes of § 71
if they share the same accommodations. Sydnes v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 170 (1977) (trial court
following IRS position, holding that spouses continuing to share common residence were not sepa-
rated within meaning of § 71(a)(3)), rev'd, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978). This position conflicts with
state statutes that recognize a period of separation, even when the parties are sharing the same accom-
modation. Two recent cases appear to be in conflict on the proper interpretation of the separation
requirement. Compare Sydnes v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the re-
quirement that parties be separated may be met as a factual matter even though the parties are living
under the same roof) with Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981) (no § 215 deduction
allowed because the couple was living in the same house and therefore was not separated within the
meaning of § 71(a)(3)). See generally Phillips, supra note 4 (arguing that "separated" for purposes
of compliance with §§ 71 and 215 should include parties living under one roof).
23. Payments made pursuant to pre- 1954 agreements, which have been amended or further nego-
tiated after 1954, have been held by the courts to fall within this provision. Mavity v. Commissioner,
341 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that payments made pursuant to a pre-1954 agreement, in
settlement of arrearages in alimony owed under a 1954 separation agreement, are within the provision
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must have been made under the agreement and based on the family rela-
tionship, (4) the payments must be periodic, (5) the payments must be
received after the execution of the agreement, and (6) the parties must
have filed separate tax returns for the year in question. A payor spouse
can utilize the deduction authorized by the mechanism only if he or she
falls squarely within its requirements. 24 As these requirements illustrate,
this mechanism is not intended to apply to all payments between
spouses.25 It applies only to periodic payments26 made pursuant to a de-
cree of divorce or a separation agreement and motivated by the marital or
family relationship. 27
The inclusion/deduction mechanism does not include voluntary pay-
ments. 28 As a general rule, a voluntary payment must be included in the
of § 71(a)); Turpin v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Miss. 1965) (holding that payments
made pursuant to a pre-1954 separation agreement are deductible).
24. Alexander III v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1979). See Taylor v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C. 1134, 1138 (1971). The Taylor court found that "Congress, at all times since the
conception of section 22(k) of the Revenue Act of 1939, has been unwilling to change the long-
standing rule regarding the nontaxability and nondeductibility of alimony payments.., except where
certain formal actions were involved." Id. at 1138. The court recognized that the addition of §
71(a)(2) and § 71(a)(3) liberalized the long-standing rule, but noted that even this liberalization ap-
plied only where there was "a written agreement or a court decree which required certain payments
to be made." Id. The court provided further that Congress did not "extend that liberalization to all
arrangements for support payments." Id.
25. See Garner v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 353, 356 (discussion of purpose of §
7 1(a)(2) and its limitations). Section 71 (b) provides expressly that "[s]ubsection (a) shall not apply to
that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix ... for the
support of minor children."
26. I.R.C. § 71(a)(2). This section provides that periodic payments do not have to be made at
regular intervals. I.R.C. § 71(c) further qualifies the term periodic payments by providing that install-
ment payments discharging an obligation, "the principal sum of which is . . . specified," are not
periodic payments unless the principal sum is to be paid "over a period ending more than 10 years
from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement." If periodic payment treatment is authorized
for payments on a principal sum extending beyond 10 years, "the installment payments shall be
treated as periodic payments... (in the case of any one taxable year of the wife) only to the extent of
10 percent of the principal sum." Payments that are subject to certain contingencies are also consid-
ered periodic. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(d)(3) to (4) (1954). See generally 3 B. BrrrKER, supra note 9, at
77-13 to -15 (discussing the periodic payment requirement); Kuntz, Simplification of the Definition of
Periodic Payments In Internal Revenue Code Section 71, 47 CIN. L. REv. 213 (1978) (arguing that
the present method of determining tax consequences of divorce or separation payments is unsatisfac-
tory).
27. This phrase has been interpreted by the regulations to mean "the general obligation to sup-
port" and does not encompass payments settling property rights. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(b)(4), -
1(c)(4) (1967); Wamack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979) (extensive review of cases focusing
on the distinction between payments for support and payments in exchange for a release of property
interest). See generally Hjorth, Tax Consequences of Post-Dissolution Support Payment Arrange-
ments, 51 WAsH. L. REv. 233, 238-46 (1976) (distinguishing deductible support payments from
nondeductible property purchases).
28. The courts have repeatedly held that voluntary payments are not deductible. Manupello v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1976) (payments not made pursuant to a written separation
agreement were voluntary and therefore nondeductible); Blanchard v. United States, 424 F. Supp.
875
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recipient's gross income. Gross income is presently defined as "all in-
come from whatever source derived."29 The nebulous concept of gross
income has been refined through both judicial interpretation and statutory
amendment. 30 The Supreme Court has interpreted this definition to in-
clude all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over
which the taxpayers have complete dominion." 31 This definition clearly
encompasses voluntary payments.
A voluntary payment does not come within the inclusion/deduction
mechanism. Therefore the payor spouse will generally be taxed when she
or he acquires the sum and will not be afforded a deduction for a volun-
tary payment. 32
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Written Separation Agreement
Requirement
The term "written separation agreement" is not defined in the Code or
the regulations. 33 The regulations do provide, however, that such an
agreement need not be legally enforceable, 34 and that it should specifi-
916 (D. Md. 1976) (holding that husband's voluntary increase of payments to ex-wife prior to judi-
cial modification was nondeductible); Taylor v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1134 (1971) (payments
made prior to separation decree were not deductible); Hoffman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1607,
1613 (1970) (payor spouse's legal obligation to make payments terminated upon recipient spouse's
remarriage; thus payments did not come within § 71(a)(l)), affdper curiam, 455 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1972); Herrmann v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 429 (1964) (voluntary payments made by the
payor spouse to cover payee's income tax were nondeductible).
29. I.R.C. §61(a)(1976).
30. In 1917, the Supreme Court held that alimony received by a divorced spouse under a court
decree was not subject to income tax under the Revenue Act of 1917, which defined income as
"'gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151
(1917). In 1920, the Supreme Court went even further by holding that the sixteenth amendment
applied only to "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Eisner v. Macom-
her, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). After the enactment of the predecessors of § 71 (a) and § 215 in 1942,
however, the Court of Claims upheld the taxability of alimony. Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
285. 288 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978 (1950). Section 61(a) of the present code expressly
includes alimony as income. See also 3 B. BITTKER, supra note 9, at 77-2 to -5 (discussing the history
of the tax treatment of alimony).
31. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
32. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). This principle is necessary to effectuate the progressive
tax rate underlying our federal tax system. A progressive tax is one that "applies higher rates progres-
sively as the taxable amount increases." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (3d ed. 1969). Such a
tax obviously provides strong inducement for a higher bracket taxpayer to assign income to a lower
bracket taxpayer. The effect of such an assignment would be to lower the total amount of tax col-
lected. J. FREELAND. S. LIND & R. STEPHENS. supra note 4, at 269-270.
33. Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 346 (1982); Bogard v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 97.
100 (1972).
34. "Written Separation Agreement.... Such payments are includable in the wife's gross in-
come whether or not the agreement is a legally enforceable instrument." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
I (b)(2)(i) (1954).
876
Separation Agreements and Income Tax
cally state the obligation to support. 35 Most litigation has centered around
the scope of the "writing" requirement. Not surprisingly, the courts have
held that a purely oral agreement is insufficient. 36 Even if there is some
related writing the courts have generally found that it is insufficient to
qualify the agreement as "written" for purposes of section 71(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code. 37
A few Tax Court decisions have considered the degree of specificity
contemplated by the term "separation agreement." In Bogard v. Com-
missioner,38 the parties executed a written separation and support agree-
ment that failed to state explicitly that the parties would live apart. 39 As a
result, the Commissioner challenged the sufficiency of the agreement
under section 71(a). The Bogard court held that the agreement was not
insufficient as a matter of law and that the parties therefore had the right
to prove actual separation.4 0 The court reasoned that a contrary decision
would "elevate form over substance" and create a "snare" for the
"unwary or uninformed.' '41
35. "Section 71(a) applies only to payments made because of the family or marital relationship
in recognition of the general obligation to support which is made specific by the decree, instrument,
or agreement." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1954).
36. Harry L. Clark, 40 T.C. 57 (1963); Alexander III v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 969
(1979); Manupello v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1976).
37. Greenfield v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (PH) 1565 (1978) (letters written by the payor
spouse are insufficient to qualify an agreement as written because they are merely unilateral offers);
Auerbach v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 948 (1975); Garner v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 353 (1973); Hill v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 837 (1973); Kraskow v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. (CCH) 1414 (1964) (transcript of courtroom proceeding in separation action insufficient to
qualify agreement as written under § 71 (a)(2)).
38. 59T.C. 97(1972).
39. The Bogard agreement read:
July 29, 1965
Until we see a lawyer, following is our agreement:
(1) As agreed, you will give me $630 per month which will cover rent, food and general
living expenses and psychiatric treatment (50 per week) which will be discontinued when treat-
ment stops.* Should rent increase you will increase monthly allotments accordingly.
(2) You will increase our life insurance by $25,000 with me as principal beneficiary.
(3) You will keep car, piano and your books, I will keep money in the bank.
(4) You are responsible for medical and dental expenses for David and me.
(5) You will pay for David's Summer Camp.
(6) You agreed to give me additional money when you have it for clothing and will be respon-
sible for David's clothing.
Signed: Howard M. Bogard
Signed: Bridget Bogard
BB * at termination of psychiatric treatment monthly payments will be decreased to
$478-$520-a month which will include rent, living expenses, telephone, & clothing for Brid-
get. HB
Id. at 99.
40. Id. at 101,102,
41. Id. at 101.
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In Jefferson v. Commissioner,42 the court held that a written separation
agreement43 lacking a fixed dollar amount was sufficient for purposes of
the statutory predecessors of section 7 l(a)(1). 44 The agreement required a
minimum payment of $6000, to be increased if the recipient spouse's
condition changed or if it was needed for any other reason. 45 The Com-
missioner argued that the payments46 were gratuitous. 47 The court re-
jected this argument because the payor spouse was legally obligated to
pay $6000 per year or more for the support of the recipient. 48
These two cases provided the foundation for the Tax Court's decision
in Jacklin v. Commissioner.49
II. THE JACKLIN DECISION
Dewey Rivkin and Patience Jacklin were married in 1965 in Arlington,
Virginia. 50 They separated in 1973 and signed a written separation agree-
ment. 51 This agreement provided for support payments to Patience suffi-
42. 13T.C. 1092(1949).
43. Arguably, this instrument, which was a letter written by the payor spouse, would also en-
counter problems with the rule that a letter written by one spouse is merely a unilateral offer. See
cases cited supra note 37. The Jefferson court did not address this issue.
44. The Jefferson case arose under the predecessor to I.R.C. §§ 71(a) and 215, which was l.R.C.
§§ 22k & 23u (1942). See supra note 12.
45. The text of the letter containing the agreement read:
May 20, 1941.
Dear Violet,
Accordingly, I now confirm, as I promised you on our trip that I would, that if the divorce is
granted, I am bound to pay, in December of each year thereafter, to you or. if you should find it
more convenient or agreeable, to Jeff, as a sort of agent or trustee for you, a sum sufficient,
according to the full measure of the standard of living to which you have been accustomed, to
cover all amounts required for your suitable maintenance, support and comfort during each year.
In your present condition of health, six thousand dollars a year would seem to be sufficient; but
should a larger amount be required by reason of improvement in your condition or for any other
reason, my agreement covers the increase.
Affectionately,
[Sig.I
Jefferson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 1092, 1094-95 (1949).
46. In 1942, the payor spouse paid the recipient $4217; in 1943, $4813.14. Neither of these
amounts was included in the gross income of the recipient. Id. at 1095.
47. Id. at 1097.
48. /d. at 1098-99.
49. 79T.C. 340(1982).
50. Id. at 341.
51. Patience conceded, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment only, that she had
executed the agreement. id. at 341 n.2.
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cient to maintain the standard of living to which she had been accustomed
during her marriage. 52
The amount Patience included as income from support payments was
significantly less than the amount Dewey deducted as payments for sup-
port.53 To insure that the payments were treated consistently and to pro-
tect revenue, the Internal Revenue Service sent deficiency notices to both
Patience and Dewey. 54 In actions contesting the deficiencies, the Com-
missioner of Revenue joined with Patience in a motion for summary judg-
ment. 55 Patience and the Commissioner argued that the payments were
not deductible by Dewey under section 215 because the separation agree-
ment was insufficient as a matter of law under section 71(a)(2). 56 The
court rejected this argument. 57
The court first reviewed the applicable statutory and regulatory provi-
sions.58 The regulations require that a separation agreement state the
payor spouse's obligation to support;59 however, the regulations also pro-
vide that such support payments are to be included in the recipient's gross
income whether or not the agreement is enforceable. 60
52. The text of paragraph 5 of the separation agreement in Jacklin read:
(5) The Husband shall pay the Wife for her assistance and maintenance whatever supplemen-
tary funds are necessary to sustain a standard of living equivalent to that which obtained before
the separation. The Wife intends to work and be independent. If the Wife ceases to work, pay-
ment will increase to meet the needs of the Wife. The payments will be at least quarterly and will
'continue until one of the following events should first occur. (a) the death of the Husband; (b) the
remarriage of the Wife; (c) the death of the Wife.
Id. at 342.
53. On his 1975 tax return Dewey deducted $24,379.20, while on her return Patience included
$14,400 as alimony received from Dewey. Id. at 343.
54. In the deficiency notices, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the entire deduction
claimed by Dewey for support payments and also increased Patience's alimony income to equal the
amount originally deducted by Dewey. Id. at 344.
55. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated that they were liv-
ing apart as of 1973, that they executed the written separation agreement in 1973, that Dewey made
payments in 1975 totaling $24,379.20 under the agreement, that Dewey's payments were periodic,
and that the payments were made because of the marital or family relationship. Thus all of the re-
quirements under § 71 (a)(2) were fulfilled, aside from the issue of whether the agreement must spec-
ify a dollar amount of support. Id. at 345.
56. Id. at 345-46.
57. Id. at 348-49.
58. The court reviewed the provisions of I.R.C. § 71(a)(2) and the treasury regulations pursuant
to § 71(a)(2), specifically Treas. Reg. 88 1.71-1(b)(2), -(b)(4) (1954).
59. Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 346-47 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I(b)(2) (1954)).
60. Id. at 347 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I(b)(2) (1954)). Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I(b)(2) (1954)
provides that a separation agreement does not have to be enforceable to be sufficient for purposes of §
71(a)(2). This provision was incorporated into the regulations directly from the legislative history,
which further provides that uniformity is intended in the treatment of alimony, "regardless of vari-
ance in the laws of different States concerning the existence and continuance of an obligation to pay
alimony." S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 568. Thus,
considering the legislative history as a whole, the concurring judge in Jacklin found that "Congress
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The IRS and Patience argued that the absence of a stated amount of
support demonstrated the lack of a sufficient separation agreement as re-
quired by section 71(a)(2). 61 They relied on prior cases in which oral
agreements and a letter signed by only one party were held to be insuffi-
cient to satisfy the written separation agreement requirement. 62 The court
rejected the application of these decisions because the written agreement
in the Jacklin case had been signed by both spouses. 63 The court turned
instead to two cases it found more applicable.
The court found guidance in Jefferson v. Commissioner, 64 though it did
not view it as directly on point. 65 Unlike the Jacklin agreement, the Jef-
ferson agreement had named a minimum payment. 66 The court empha-
sized, however, that the Jacklin agreement provided some standard for
determining the necessary amount of support. 67 The agreement required
that Dewey pay Patience "for her assistance and maintenance whatever
supplementary funds are necessary to sustain a standard of living equiva-
lent to that which obtained before the separation.' '68
The court also found support in the "somewhat analogous case" 69 of
Bogard v. Commissioner.70 In Bogard, the existence of the agreement
itself as a "separation" agreement had to be determined. 7' In Jacklin, the
nature and amount of the payments needed to be resolved. The court
adopted the concerns of the Bogard court that a contrary decision would
elevate form over substance and constitute a trap for the unwary. 7 2
was concerned with oddities of State laws" and did not intend that "payments made by one spouse to
another under an instrument wholly unenforceable under normal rules of contract law were intended
to be deductible by the payor and taxable to the payee." 79 T.C. at 353-54 (Whitaker, J., concur-
ring).
61. 79T.C. at 347-48.
62. Patience and the IRS cited Saniewski v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1979) (let-
ter written to recipient spouse by payor spouse is unilateral offer of support and not a written separa-
tion agreement); Auerbach v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 948 (1975) (oral agreement is insuf-
ficient to qualify as a written separation agreement); Garner v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 353
(1973) (documents offered were merely references to an oral agreement and failed to constitute a
written separation agreement). Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 347 n. 10.
63. Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 348.
64. 13T.C. 1092(1942).
65. Jacklin, 79T.C. at 348.
66. The Jefferson agreement stated that "a sum sufficient, according to the full measure of the
standard of living" to which the recipient had been accustomed, would be paid. At that time, because
of the recipient's condition of health, $6000 a year was agreed to be sufficient. Jefferson, 13 T.C. at
1094-95. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
67. Jacklin, 79T.C. at 351.
68. Id. (quoting from paragraph 5 of the Jacklin agreement, supra note 52).
69. Id. at 350.
70. 59 T.C. 97 (1972).
71. Id. at 100. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
72. Jacklin, 79T.C. at 351.
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The court did observe that such an ambiguous agreement "foments dis-
putes and provides another battlefield on which the warring spouses can
renew hostilitie. ",73 It concluded, however, that the Jacklin agreement
was not insufficient as a matter of law. 74 If Dewey could establish all the
necessary elements under section 71 (a)(2), Patience would be required to




The Jacklin court's decision blurs the distinction between alimony pay-
ments and voluntary payments. The problem stems from the court's fail-
ure to address the underlying legal issue raised by Patience's and
Dewey's separation agreement: At what point does a separation agree-
ment become so vague that any payment made pursuant to it is gratuitous
or voluntary? 76 If a payment is essentially voluntary77 it should not come
within the alimony inclusion/deduction system.
The courts have not articulated a standard for determining when a pay-
ment is voluntary. Logically, a payment should be regarded as voluntary
when it is made pursuant to an agreement in which a payor spouse retains
excessive control over the amount to be paid.78 This standard simply ar-
73. Id.
74. The case was remanded for decision on the facts. Id. at 352.
75. Id. at 352.
76. The court did recognize a distinction between payments madle pursuant to a written separa-
tion agreement and payments made when there is no written agreement reflecting a meeting of the
minds. Id. at 347. Thus the court implied that there is a point at which there is no "written separation
agreement" sufficient for purposes of the inclusion/deduction system. However, it offered no assis-
tance on where this point is.
The concurrence agreed with the majority that the Jacklin agreement was legally sufficient. Id. at
352 (Whitaker, J., concurring). However, the concurrence argued that agreements that do not pro-
vide some mechanism for determining support and that are not enforceable under "general principles
of contract law" are not legally sufficient. Id. at 352-53. The concurring justice framed his standard
in terms of "general principles of contract law" to avoid a conflict with Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I(b)(2)(i)
(1954), which provides that a separation agreement does not have to be enforceable in a court of law
for purposes of I.R.C. § 71(a)(2). Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 352-53 (Whitaker, J., concurring).
77. If a voluntary payment is gratuitous it still does not come within the inclusion/deduction
system. However, a gratuitous payment, unlike other voluntary payments, is not included in the
recipient's income. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1976). The Jacklin court did not address the issue of whether
Dewey's payments were gratuitous.
78. The language of the concurring opinion in Jacklin supports this standard when it states that
"where the language of an agreement is so vague as to indicate there was no meeting of the minds on
the amount of support and no basis for determining the nature or extent of the obligation, any pay-
ment would be gratutious." Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 353-54 (Whitaker, J., concurring).
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ticulates the practical meaning of obligation. If one can choose how much
to pay, one is not obligated.
The suggested standard effectuates the legislative purpose for the inclu-
sion/deduction scheme. 79 By permitting a deduction for an obligatory
payment, it relieves the payor's financial burden. The payor who has con-
trol over the amount of the payment, however, does not need legislative
help to avoid an excessive financial burden. The unobligated payor can
simply reduce the amount of payment.
Under this standard, a payment made pursuant to an agreement that is
enforceable in court may still be voluntary for tax purposes. Most agree-
ments are never taken to court. Payments are made, and amounts are in-
cluded or deducted on tax returns, based on the amount specified in the
agreement. If no amount is specified, the payor spouse retains excessive
control over the amount of the payment. If this amount seems unreason-
able, the recipient may challenge it in court. If the recipient does not chal-
lenge the payment, however, and includes it in his or her income, 80 it
would be difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to challenge the
payor's choice.
Under the suggested standard, a payment made pursuant to the separa-
tion agreement in the Jacklin case was voluntary. Whether or not the
Jacklin agreement was enforceable in state court, 81 Dewey could choose
how much to pay unless Patience was willing to go to court. Thus Dewey
retained excessive control over the amount of payment.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 9-1I.
80. Before the payor spouse can deduct an alimony payment under I.R.C. § 215 (1976) the
recipient spouse must include the payment in her or his income.
81. In order for an agreement to be binding, the content of that agreement cannot be unduly
uncertain or indefinite. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1981). Courts do not, how-
ever, favor the destruction of contracts; thus, courts often construe them so as to "carry into effect the
reasonable intention of the parties, if that can be determined." Mag Constr. Co. v. McLean County,
181 N.W.2d 718, 721 (N.D. 1970). Courts have found less room for implication in cases where a
term has been referred to but still left indefinite. See Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J. Super.
311, 258 A.2d 153 (Law Div. 1969), affd, 114 N.J. Super. 221, 275 A.2d 759 (App. Div. 1971); 1
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 40 (3d ed. 1957).
In the process of negotiating an agreement, parties often leave the amount of compensation to be
settled by future agreement or by some other specified method. This is true both of agreements for
services and of those for the purchase and sale of goods. If the parties provide a practicable objective
method for determining the amount of compensation, not leaving it to the future will of the parties
themselves, the agreement is sufficiently definite and certain to be an enforceable contract. I A.
CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRAcrS § 97, at 424-25 (1963). The amount of compensation is sufficiently
definite for the agreement to be enforceable if the parties specify a practicable method by which a
court can determine the amount without any new expression by the parties themselves. Id. § 98, at
433-34.
The Jacklin agreement, by requiring that Dewey pay Patience an amount sufficent to allow her to
achieve her prior standard of living, arguably provided a method by which the court could calculate
Dewey's required payment. By consulting the parties' financial records, the court should have been
able to arrive at a figure without any additional expression by the parties. Thus, under general con-
tract doctrine, the Jacklin agreement was probably enforceable.
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The Jacklin court failed to confront the issue of voluntariness by refus-
ing to require a minimum support payment for a "sufficient" written sep-
aration agreement. 82 Instead, the Jacklin court relied on the Jefferson v.
Commissioner decision83 to support its position. 84 Unlike the Jacklin
agreement, 85 however, the Jefferson agreement clearly established a min-
imum support payment of $6000.86 The payor spouse did not have control
over the decision to pay at least this amount. 87
The Jacklin court might also have relied on the regulations interpreting
section 71(a)(2). 88 Under these regulations, 89 alimony payments are in-
cludable in the recipient spouse's gross income "whether or not the
agreement is a legally enforceable instrument."90 This provision, how-
ever, arguably was aimed at avoiding aberrations in state contract law that
could upset the uniformity of the federal tax system.91 Requiring a dollar
amount does not thwart this purpose. 92 Without some minimum criteria
for a "sufficient" separation agreement, the statutory language requiring
an agreement is meaningless. 93
B. Practical Problems
Two major practical problems flow from the Jacklin decision. The first
82. Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 352.
83. 13T.C. 1092(1949).
84. Jacklin, 79T.C. at349-50.
85. The Jacklin agreement required the payment of "supplementary funds . . . necessary to
sustain a standard of living equivalent to that which obtained before the separation." See supra note
52.
86. Seesupranote45.
87. Jefferson, 13 T.C. at 1098-99.
88. The concurrence, with these regulations in mind, argued that the difference between volun-
tary and obligatory payments, for purposes of the inclusion/deduction mechanism, is whether they
are made pursuant to a separation agreement that is enforceable under "general principles of contract
law." Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 352-54 (Whitaker, J., concurring); see supra note 76.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii) (1954).
90. Id. It could also be argued that by not including the words "in discharge of a legal obliga-
tion" in § 71(a)(2), as it did in § 71(a)(1), Congress was reinforcing the applicability of § 71(a)(2),
regardless of whether the separation agreement is enforceable under state law. Engelhardt v. Com-
missioner, 58 T.C. 641,646 (1972).
91. Congressional intent may be indicated by a statement in the Senate Report on the Revenue
Act of 1942, which provided that uniformity of treatment of alimony payments was intended "re-
gardless of variance in the laws of different States concerning the existence and continuance of an
obligation to pay alimony." S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 83 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2
C.B. 568. See also Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841,846 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that the "vagar-
ies of Texas marital law cannot operate to defeat the obvious intent of the statute that it be uniformly
applied").
92. Cf. Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 354 (Whitaker, J., concurring).
93. It is a rule of statutory construction that, if it does not destroy the sense or effect of the law,
significance and meaning should be accorded every phrase and word in a statute. 2A C. SANDS,
STATUTEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCON § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
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is the danger of collusion.94 A Jacklin-type agreement allows the parties
to adjust the amount of payment annually and thus offers opportunities to
reduce the taxes paid by the payor spouse. For example, a prosperous
payor and a willing recipient can cooperate for mutual benefit. 95 Under a
Jacklin-type agreement they can agree that in the payor's high-income
years, more support will be paid than the recipient needs. In exchange,
the recipient will accept less support in the payor's low-income years,
when the section 215 deduction will be less useful to the payor.
Such an arrangement would be less workable under a standard separa-
tion agreement. 96 Any payments in excess of the specified amount would
be voluntary and thus nondeductible by the payor.97 Such an arrangement
under a Jacklin-type agreement would be easily workable and potentially
profitable. 98 Congress clearly did not have this tax-evading device in
mind when it created the inclusion/deduction mechanism.
94. Professor Bittker states that with the advent of the joint return, "the danger of collusive
arrangements evaporated because no informal split of income between spouses could produce a lower
tax than a joint return." 3 B. BiTrKER, supra note 9, at 77-5 to -6 (footnote omitted). While it is true
that no split can do better than a joint return, if parties want to separate, an arrangement that allows
flexibility from year to year for payments would in many cases result in lower taxes than a traditional
separation agreement.
95. By cooperating, the recipient can bargain for a larger amount of support and the payor spouse
will be able to afford it, because less will be paid in taxes.
96. Once the IRS discovered such an arrangement under a standard separation agreement it
would clearly be unworkable. However, such an arrangement might not be discovered as long as the
recipient was willing to declare all payments that the payor deducted.
97. Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 389, 390 (3d Cir. 1949).
Such an arrangement, made under a Jefferson-type agreement, would probably be workable. See
Jefferson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 1092 (1949). The opportunity provided by the "for any other
reason" language in the Jefferson agreement seems virtually unlimited. See supra note 45. The re-
quirement of a fixed minimum payment, however, would reduce the profitability of such an arrange-
ment.





Assume also that the recipient has no income other than alimony and has $1700 of itemized deduc-
tions, or just enough to offset his or her zero bracket amount. Under a standard separation agreement
with a provision for $25,000 per year alimony, the two parties' total tax, over the three-year period,
would equal $49,932:
Payor's Recipient's
Year PGI* Alimony EID* PTI* Tax RGI* Tax
1 80.000 25,000 15,000 40,000 13,752 25,000 6,652
2 80,000 25,000 10,000 45,000 16,224 25,000 6,652
3 40,000 25,000 40,000 0 0 25,000 6,652
Under a Jacklin-type agreement, the parties could pay $6924 less over a three-year period:
Separation Agreements and Income Tax
Second, Jacklin-type agreements require unwieldy calculations. These
calculations will waste everyone's time: the parties', the IRS', and possi-
bly the courts'. Divorce tax lawyers will have nightmares trying to advise
clients how much alimony to pay under a Jacklin-type agreement. Pay-
ments of any size will be open to challenge. 99 In effect, the Tax Court
will have the responsibility of setting the amount of annual deductions.
The IRS, too, will be in an awkward position. 100 Most alimony-tax
disputes are settled by the IRS at desk audits. To settle such a dispute
under a Jacklin-type agreement, the IRS will have to determine how
much money is necessary to support the recipient at the level to which she
or he was accustomed prior to the separation. When a couple cannot
agree, the family court, 101 not the IRS or the Tax Court, 102 generally
makes this type of determination.
Payor's Recipient's
Year PGI* Alimony EID* PTI* Tax RGI* Tax
1 80,000 40,000 15,000 25,000 6,652 40,000 13,752
2 80,000 35,000 10,000 35,000 11,302 35,000 11,302
3 40,000 0 40,000 0 0 0 0




All figures are based on I.R.C. § l(d)(1) (1982).
Under any type of agreement, the initial problem for the IRS in preventing such arrangements
would be discovery. See supra note 96. Under a standard agreement, once the arrangement is discov-
ered it could be stopped. Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d. 389 (3d Cir- 1949). However,
under a Jacklin-type agreement, discovery would merely be the first step in a long court struggle in
which the IRS would be faced with challenging the parties' combined argument that the amounts paid
were all the recipient needed in that particular year. Although in an obvious case the IRS would
probably win, the struggle involved in arriving at the proper support figure would waste both the
court's and the government's time. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
99. The amount of each year's (or month's) alimony payment could become a weapon in the
hands of either spouse. The recipient, especially, would be susceptible to the payor spouse's reduc-
tion of the payments because the recipient would not know at what point a court challenge would be
effective and therefore economically profitable.
100. In this situation, the IRS position is already complicated by the potential for whipsaw. Final
Report, Special Committee on Whipsaw, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, 30 TAX
LAW. 127, 141 (1976). This potential exists "whenever two (or more) taxpayers have adverse inter-
ests in the manner in which a specific item or transaction is taxed." Id. at 127. See 3 B. BrrrIKER,
supra note 9, at 77-23 to -24.
101. To determine the needs of the recipient, domestic relations courts consider four main fac-
tors:
i. The resources of the recipient spouse ....
2. The earning capacity of the recipient spouse and the extent of his or her opportunity to
work.
3. The age, health, and general physical condition of the parties.
4. The social standing, needs, comforts, and luxuries of life reflected in the standard of living
the recipient spouse would have probably enjoyed had it not been for the enforced separation.
White & Stone, Consumer Unit Scaling as an Aid in Equitably Determining Need Under Mainte-
nance and Child Support Decrees, 13 FAM. L.Q. 231, 232-33 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
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If such a dispute reaches the Tax Court, considerable time and effort
will be required to resolve the issue. 103 Moreover, whether made by the
parties, the IRS, or the court, this determination must be reconsidered
each year because of fluctuations in the needs of the recipient spouse.
The Jacklin majority foresaw the practical problems created by its deci-
sion104 but was persuaded by the Bogard v. Commissioner court's specter
of a trap for the unwary' 05 to hold that the agreement was not legally
insufficient. 106 Ironically, in the analogous area of child support, just
such a trap has been upheld. In Commissioner v. Lester, 107 the Court held
that payments made pursuant to an agreement which failed to specify an
amount for child support would be treated as alimony. 108 The Court stated
that even " 'a sufficiently clear purpose' on the part of the parties" was
not enough to exclude the payments from the recipient's income where
the agreement failed to state that the payments were for child support. 109
The courts have not always been so concerned about creating traps for the
unwary.
Moreover, the policy reasons that compelled the Bogard decision are
inapplicable here. 110 It is easy to believe that parties preparing a separa-
tion agreement could forget to include, or not see the necessity of includ-
ing, a formal statement that they are living apart. Similar non-tax, per-
sonal reasons, however, do not justify a separation agreement that fails to
specify a dollar amount for support and that may be unenforceable as a
contract.
Parties may want to use a Jacklin-type agreement to avoid specifying a
102. Such a determination is difficult for the experienced domestic relations court. Id. at 234. It
would be more difficult for the inexperienced Tax Court.
103. In fact, one of the reasons for encouraging the use of separation agreements between parties
is to "prevent protracted litigation of spousal rights." Note, Modification of Spousal Support: A
Survey of a Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 717 (1978-79) (citing the UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 306 (1973).
104. Jacklin, 79T.C. at 351.
105. 59T.C. 97, 101 (1972).
106. Jacklin, 79T.C. at 350-51.
107. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
108. Id. at301.
109. Id. at 305.
110. In fact, the Bogard court stated that:
Logically, it appears Congress was interested in a clear statement in written form of the terms
of support where the parties are separated. In this manner it is administratively convenient for
the Commissioner to apprise himself of the amount of gross income to the wife and the corre-
sponding deduction allowable to the husband.
Bogard v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 97, 101 (1972).
The court then proceeded in the same paragraph to explain why, because an actual separation was
required, a statement of separation was supererogatory. Id.
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dollar figure when its components are unknown or highly variable."1 '
Nevertheless, a nonspecific agreement is a poor solution because it leaves
the recipient spouse in a vulnerable position. 112 The better solution is to
search for innovative ways of fixing the amount of alimony while still
allowing for flexibility. 113 Two other possible reasons for entering into
such an agreement are inequality of bargaining power and collusion. 114
Both are against public policy. The tax system should not encourage such
agreements by finding them sufficient to establish a deduction for the
payor. On examination, there are no legitimate non-tax reasons for enter-
ing into a separation agreement which does not specify a dollar amount.
C. Proposal
The major deficiency of the Jacklin court's decision is its failure to
specify any criteria for measuring the sufficiency of a written separation
agreement. The court could have specified two different criteria.
One possibility requires that the separation agreement be enforceable
under "general principles of contract law."11 5 This requirement would
give meaning to the language of section 71 (a)(2); 116 but it would not solve
the problem of voluntariness. 117 Because a Jacklin-type agreement may
be enforceable under general contract law," 18 the danger of collusion and
the practical problems considered above would still exist.
A better alternative would require the separation agreement to include a
dollar figure for support. This could be either a flat dollar amount or an
amount tied to other clearly articulated variables. Possibilities include ty-
ing the support figure to the payor's income, the recipient's income,
health care costs, rent payments, or the inflation rate. 1 19 Inclusion of one
of these objective variables will not affect the agreement's enforceability
I 11. It appears, from the language of the Jacklin agreement, that the parties were unsure of the
recipient's future employment. See supra note 52.
112. Seesupranote99.
113. In the Jacklin case, if the problem really was the uncertainty of the recipient's future em-
ployment, the amount of alimony could have been set at X dollars minus any salary or wages the
recipient received. See infra note 119.
114. See supra note 98. Under the facts outlined in note 98, the recipient's tax under a standard
separation agreement is $19,956 for a three-year period. By allowing the payor spouse to "dump"
income on the recipient in certain years, the recipient's tax is increased to $25,054 over the same
three-year period. Unless the parties are working together and splitting their profits, this is not an
advantageous agreement for the recipient.
115. Jacklin, 79 T.C. at 353-54 (Whitaker, J., concurring). See supra notes 76, 81 & 88.
116. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
118. See supra note 81.
119. The IRS has recognized the sufficiency of agreements which provide for payments subject
to annual inflation adjustments. Rev. Proc. 82-53, 1982-2 C.B. 842.
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under state contract law. 120 This solution would solve the conceptual and
practical problems created by the decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Jacklin court blurred the distinction between a voluntary payment
aid an obligatory one by holding that an agreement "not wholly without
some standard" for maintenance is sufficient as a matter of law.12' This
distinction is fundamental to the inclusion/deduction scheme. The deci-
sion has also created immense practical problems. Because there is no
legitimate benefit from entering into a Jacklin-type agreement, the court
should not encourage such agreements. The court should have imposed a
dollar figure requirement for sufficiency under section 71 (a)(2).
Kay Brown
120. Generally, Washington state courts have not questioned the propriety of escalator clauses in
spousal maintenance awards. See Verde v. Verde, 78 Wn. 2d 206, 471 P.2d 84 (1970) (escalator
clause based on percentage of income increases); Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wn. 2d 473, 341 P.2d 882
0959) (maintenance payment calculated as a percentage of monthly income).
121. 79T.C.at351.
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